FAQ
How the patented process works, what the patents cover, and how licensing works.
It is a recovery process that gives an authorized operator a completely separate way to cut off a hijacker and regain control of a device, vehicle, or facility when the normal control path has been compromised.
We hold three US patents (US 11,092,957, US 11,679,894, US 12,037,132) that together cover a specific emergency override architecture. The idea is straightforward. Your device normally operates over a primary communication link, whether that is RF, cellular, WiFi, or an industrial network. Our patented process adds a second, independent communication path that stays dormant during normal operation. If the primary path gets hijacked, spoofed, or taken over, an authorized operator sends a coded activation message over that second path. An auxiliary controller on the device receives it, validates the code, and physically disconnects the attacker by triggering relays that cut the antenna, the receiver, or the power. The attacker is locked out. The device’s own onboard systems handle what happens next, whether that is return to base, safe shutdown, or holding position.
It is a patented process, not a pre-manufactured product. You implement it into your own systems with complete flexibility to match your architecture, your risk level, and your budget.
We are not selling you a box or a module off a shelf. We are licensing a patent-protected process that describes a specific emergency override architecture: auxiliary controller, alternate communication channel, coded activation, and physical disconnection of the compromised primary path. How you build it is entirely up to you. A commercial drone operator might use a few low-cost components. A defense contractor might spend months engineering a hardened, multi-factor, satellite-linked implementation. The same patented process supports both extremes and everything in between. We also provide consultation to help you map the process into your specific systems, select appropriate communication channels, and design activation workflows that fit your operational environment.
Any system where someone controls something remotely and losing that control would be costly, dangerous, or both. Drones, vehicles, vessels, industrial machinery, and connected facilities are all strong candidates.
The common thread is straightforward. If you depend on a communication link to operate or manage an asset, and that link could be hijacked or compromised, you have a gap. Existing failsafes only help if the device knows something is wrong. Our process covers the case where it does not. The best fit is wherever that gap creates the most risk, whether that is a drone carrying an expensive sensor payload, an autonomous delivery vehicle on public roads, or a water treatment plant running on a SCADA network. The stronger the consequence of losing control, the stronger the case for having an independent recovery path.
During normal operation, everything runs through the primary communication link. The backup path is dormant. When the operator recognizes a problem, they send a coded message over the alternate channel, and the auxiliary controller takes action to cut off the attacker.
Here is the sequence. First, your device operates normally on its primary link. The auxiliary controller sits quietly in the background, powered by its own independent battery, listening on a completely different communication mode. It does not broadcast beacons. Second, the operator notices something is wrong. Maybe the device stopped responding to commands, started behaving erratically, or the operator got locked out entirely. Third, the operator sends an authenticated message containing a predetermined code over the alternate channel, for example via cellular SMS when the primary link is RF. Fourth, the auxiliary controller validates the code and activates one or more relays. Those relays physically disconnect the primary receiver from its antenna, shut off the receiver, or cut power entirely. Fifth, the hijacker is now locked out. The device’s own failsafe logic takes over from there.
Six things. A primary controller, a base controller (operator side), the normal communication path between them, an auxiliary controller, a second communication channel that uses a different mode than the first, and a coded activation method.
That is the core architecture. The auxiliary controller can be remarkably simple. For a mid-range commercial drone, it can be a small microcontroller chip, a cellular module with a SIM card, a small independent battery, and one or two electromechanical relays. It sits dormant, listens on the cellular channel, and when it receives an authenticated SMS with the correct code, it validates the message and triggers the relays. The relays physically disconnect the primary receiver or cut power. That is the entire mechanism at its simplest. For higher-value assets you add encryption, GPS tracking, tamper detection, satellite communication, and multi-factor authentication, but the building blocks stay the same.
The auxiliary controller disconnects the attacker from the device. After that, the device’s own onboard systems handle what comes next, whether that means landing, stopping, shutting down, or returning to base.
The override does not fly the drone or steer the vehicle. That is a common misconception. In its simplest form, it activates relays that physically sever the connection between the attacker and the device. Think of it like pulling the plug on someone who has taken over your system. A relay cuts the antenna line, another cuts receiver power, or another kills the main power entirely. Once the attacker’s link is dead, the device falls back on its own built-in behavior. A drone enters return-to-home or controlled descent. A ground vehicle comes to a controlled stop. An industrial system goes to its safe state. The client can also choose to add command capability through the alternate channel for more sophisticated recovery, but even the basic relay cutoff is effective on its own.
You get the drone back by removing the attacker, not by piloting it yourself through SMS. For vehicles, same principle: cut the compromised telematics link and let the vehicle’s own systems handle the driving. For industrial systems, isolate the compromised network path and let the equipment go to its safe state. The override is about cutting off hostile control, not about replacing the primary control system.
At minimum, you can isolate the compromised path and stop unauthorized control. Beyond that: return to base, safe stop, hover or hold position, immobilization, communications isolation, terminal lockout, selective power cutoff, location reporting, and facility segment isolation. The client defines the response.
For drones, the relay cuts the signal line between the RC receiver and the flight controller. The flight controller enters its configured failsafe, which could be land, return to home, or hover in place. For autonomous vehicles, the auxiliary controller connects to the ignition circuit or motor power relay. When activated, it cuts ignition, the vehicle comes to a controlled stop, and a GPS module can report the vehicle’s location via the alternate channel. For industrial SCADA systems, the auxiliary controller connects to critical valve actuators or circuit breakers via relay contacts. When activated, control signals to actuators are cut and the equipment goes to its defined safe position. You can also design tiered responses: a first activation might isolate the compromised communication path, and a second, more aggressive activation might cut power entirely.
Both are possible. In simpler implementations, the alternate path mainly triggers containment, cutting off the attacker. In more capable implementations, it serves as a temporary backup control path after the primary is disconnected.
For a basic relay-based setup, the alternate channel sends the activation command and the relay does its job. That is effective and simple. For a more advanced implementation, the auxiliary controller can accept ongoing commands through the alternate channel: directing a drone to a recovery waypoint, reading telemetry from an industrial system, or sending status queries to a vehicle. The choice depends on your goals, your budget, and how much capability you want in the backup path. Even the simplest version, just cutting the attacker off, is a major improvement over having no recovery option at all.
Standard failsafes depend on the device recognizing a problem. Our process addresses the harder case where the device does not realize it has been hijacked. If the device does not know anything is wrong, none of its failsafe logic will ever trigger. Our process gives the human operator a separate way to intervene when onboard detection fails.
Lost-link behavior activates when the device detects that it has lost communication with the operator. Return-to-home activates when the device recognizes it cannot maintain its mission. These are good features and they work well for the scenarios they were designed for. But they all require the device to know something is wrong. A sophisticated hijacker does not cause a communication loss. The hijacker takes over the communication. The device still has a link. It still receives commands. It just does not know those commands are coming from an attacker. In that scenario, lost-link never triggers, return-to-home never triggers, and every onboard failsafe stays dormant. Our process exists precisely for that gap.
Consider the real failure modes. An attacker uses a stronger signal to overpower the legitimate control link, and the device accepts the attacker’s commands as if they were authentic. Or the attacker physically steals the primary controller, and the device has no way to know the controller changed hands. Or the attacker breaks the encryption on the primary channel, so commands look legitimate to the onboard systems. Or the compromise comes from inside the operator’s own infrastructure, an insider threat the device was never designed to detect. In all of these cases, existing failsafes stay silent. Without our process, the operator can only watch. With it, the operator can take decisive action through an independent channel.
This is not just a second pipe. It is a recovery architecture that combines a different communication mode, coded operator activation, and an auxiliary controller that can physically disable the compromised primary path. Redundancy alone does not give you that.
A backup datalink is typically designed for continuity. If the first link drops, traffic switches to the second. Both links usually use similar technology and operate in similar ways. An attacker who compromises one may compromise both, especially if they share infrastructure, protocols, or authentication. Our process is architecturally different. The alternate channel uses a different communication mode from the primary, for example cellular when the primary is RF, or satellite when the primary is cellular. It stays dormant during normal operations. It connects to a separate auxiliary controller with its own power supply that has the physical ability to disconnect the primary system via relays. And it requires authenticated coded activation by the operator. It is a specific process, not just the general idea of having a backup.
Most remote disable features still depend on the same communications architecture that may be compromised. Our process uses a separate, coded, emergency path designed specifically for when the primary path itself is the problem.
A typical kill switch or remote disable sends a command through the same network or control channel the device already uses. If that channel is under hostile control, the kill command may never arrive, or it may be intercepted and blocked by the attacker. Safe mode features are onboard logic that the device activates when it detects a fault, which brings us back to the same core issue: the device has to know something is wrong first. Our process operates on an independent communication path that the attacker may not even know exists. It does not rely on the compromised channel to deliver the command. It does not rely on the device detecting the compromise.
No. This is designed to complement your existing safety systems, not replace them. Your current failsafes handle the cases they can detect. Our process handles the case they cannot.
Think of it as a fire alarm system versus a manual fire alarm pull station. Both serve a purpose. The automated system catches most fires. The pull station exists because the automated system might miss one. You would never rip out the automated system just because you added a manual pull station. Same logic here. Your return-to-home logic, your lost-link procedures, your safety interlocks, all of that stays in place. This process adds a separate recovery layer for the harder case.
Those are primarily preventive controls. They try to stop the attacker from getting in. Our process addresses what an authorized operator can still do after the primary path is lost, hijacked, or no longer trusted. You can have the best locks on every door and still want a fire escape.
Zero trust verifies every access request. OT segmentation limits lateral movement. Endpoint security hardens individual devices. All of that is good and important. But none of it gives the operator a separate dormant path to remotely cut off a compromised interface on demand. If an attacker gets through your preventive controls, and sophisticated attackers sometimes do, your operator needs a way to act. Strong prevention reduces the frequency of incidents. A strong recovery capability reduces the severity when prevention fails.
They form one portfolio that expanded over time. The first patent addresses remotely controlled devices like drones. The second extends to vehicles, watercraft, devices, and physical facilities. The third extends to control systems, including industrial control systems, where the primary means of communication has been lost, hijacked, or otherwise compromised. Same core process, broader application scope with each filing.
Patent 1 (US 11,092,957), “Navigation controller system and method for retrieving control of a remotely controlled device,” establishes the foundation: auxiliary controller, alternate communication mode, coded activation. Patent 2 (US 11,679,894), “System and method for enabling the emergency remote override of a hijacked operation of a vehicle, a device or a facility,” broadens the application to vehicles, vessels, and industrial facilities, with coded messaging and multi-authentication methods. Patent 3 (US 12,037,132), “System and method for enabling an authorized operator of a control system to remotely reestablish communication with the control system where a primary means of communication with the control system has been lost, hijacked or otherwise compromised,” extends the process to compromised control systems in vehicles, industrial facilities, and more.
Because the portfolio shows the same core process applied across progressively more asset types and architectures over time. That gives you broader strategic coverage, not just a narrow use case. The immediate value may be in one vertical, but the broader portfolio supports a common emergency override concept across your connected assets.
Consider a large defense contractor that builds UAVs, ground vehicles, and manages fixed installations. Or a logistics company that operates fleet vehicles, warehouse automation, and delivery drones. Or a utility that manages pipeline stations, power substations, and remote monitoring equipment. For a company considering acquisition, the portfolio represents a position across multiple verticals, not just one product category.
The process uses a coded messaging scheme with a predetermined specific code known only to the operator and the auxiliary controller. Clients can layer stronger authentication on top for higher-risk environments.
At the simplest level, the auxiliary controller is programmed with a specific activation key. An incoming message must contain the exact key to trigger any action. Messages without the correct key are silently ignored. Brute force is impractical if the key space is large enough, and the controller can lock out after a threshold of failed attempts. For medium-value assets like commercial vehicles or fleet drones, you can add encrypted messaging, certificate-based authentication, hardware-encrypted key storage, and anti-replay protection. For high-value assets like military platforms or critical infrastructure, you can implement multi-factor authentication, multi-person approval workflows, encrypted satellite communication, tamper detection, and challenge-response protocols. The security scales with what you are protecting. The patented process supports the entire range.
The override path is designed as a separate, coded, dormant emergency mechanism, not a routine operating interface. It does not broadcast beacons or carry traffic during normal operation, and it does not appear on the primary network. Exactly how quiet and well hidden it is depends on how the implementer builds it, since the patents cover the process rather than one specific piece of hardware. An attacker who does not know it exists has no reason to target it.
Even if an attacker suspects a backup system exists, they face a fundamental problem. They do not know what communication mode it uses. They do not have the authentication credentials. And the auxiliary controller does not act on anything except the correct coded activation message. Compare that to the alternative: having no override capability at all. If the primary path is compromised and there is no independent recovery mechanism, the device is simply lost. The small risk of a dormant, authenticated backup channel being discovered and exploited is outweighed by the very real risk of having zero recovery options during an actual compromise.
The value does not depend only on secrecy. Even if the attacker knows the architecture, the process still provides a separate communication path, separate authentication, and the ability to cut off the compromised interface when the device has not detected the problem.
Secrecy is the first layer, but it is not the only layer. Suppose the attacker knows there is a cellular backup. They still need to know the exact phone number of the SIM card in the auxiliary controller. They still need to know the authentication code. They still need to jam cellular infrastructure, which is technically difficult, legally risky, and operationally counterproductive because the attacker would lose their own cellular communications. For higher-security implementations, the client can use encrypted satellite links, require multi-factor authentication, implement challenge-response protocols, or even distribute multiple auxiliary controllers in hidden locations on the same asset. Each additional layer makes the attacker’s job harder. The point is not that the system is impossible to defeat. The point is that it gives the operator a recovery option that did not exist before and makes the attacker’s operation more complex.
No. The key requirement is that the second communication mode be different from the primary one. The specific technology is flexible and depends on your system, your environment, and your threat model.
The alternate channel could be cellular SMS, 4G LTE, satellite, LoRaWAN for long-range low-power applications, UHF or VHF burst transmission, HF radio, a different cellular carrier or band from the primary, or even a wired connection in fixed installations. What matters is mode diversity. You want the backup to use fundamentally different infrastructure and frequencies so that the same attack or failure is unlikely to take out both paths. For commercial drones operating in urban areas, cellular is an obvious choice. For a vessel at sea or assets operating in remote environments, satellite provides coverage where cellular does not. For an industrial facility, a dedicated cellular modem independent of the plant network works well. The choice is an implementation decision.
No recovery method is guaranteed if every path is denied. The value is that a different communication mode makes the attacker’s job significantly harder and gives the operator another chance to recover. This is resilience through independence, not a claim of invulnerability.
The attacker typically focuses on the communication mode the device is known to use. If a drone operates on RF, the attacker’s equipment targets those frequencies. A cellular backup operates on different infrastructure at different frequencies. To block it, the attacker would need additional equipment, knowledge that the backup exists, and willingness to jam cellular, which is illegal in most jurisdictions and likely to draw attention from law enforcement and spectrum monitoring. It is also self-defeating: if they jam cellular, they lose their own ability to communicate. For satellite backup, the equipment needed to jam satellite links is specialized and expensive. And for the highest-value assets, nothing stops the client from implementing three or more alternate channels. The honest answer is that nothing is foolproof. But the process improves recovery odds compared to having no independent override at all.
The process supports a single authorized operator model and also supports multi-party activation. In practice, you map the process into your existing command structure so that request, approval, execution, and audit are clearly assigned.
For a solo drone operator, you are the authorized user. You decide when to invoke it. For a commercial fleet, you might require a fleet manager or supervisor to approve activation before the message is sent. For military or critical infrastructure, you implement a formal multi-person workflow. Approaches include a single authorized user with a coded message; two-person approval, where one person initiates and a second must confirm before the activation is sent; device-level multi-factor, where the auxiliary controller requires two separate authenticated messages from two different sources within a time window; and challenge-response, where the device sends a confirmation request back and the operator must provide a second authentication. The right model depends on the consequence of activation and the risk of misuse.
The process supports restricted coded activation and multi-person approval for high-consequence environments. It is meant to be a tightly controlled emergency authority, not a general-purpose backdoor.
The same protections that prevent external misuse also help prevent internal misuse. Multi-person approval means no single insider can activate the override alone. Audit logging can record every activation attempt. Challenge-response protocols mean the device itself verifies the request before acting. For the highest-security implementations, you can require two separate authenticated messages from two different authorized sources within a specific time window. And the override itself is a controlled, defined action, not open-ended access to the system. It triggers a specific predetermined response, such as cutting the primary communication path or putting the device in a safe state.
The operator does. The override activates when a human operator recognizes that something is wrong and makes a deliberate decision to act. The operator acts on what they can observe: the device is not responding, it is doing things nobody commanded, or the operator has been locked out entirely. The process does not require the system to diagnose the attack first.
We recommend a three-category trigger framework that clients customize to their own operations. Category one is loss of trusted response: you send commands and the device does not follow them, but it is still moving or operating. Category two is evidence of unauthorized actuation: the device is doing things you did not tell it to do, changing course, activating equipment, executing commands you never sent. Category three is operator lockout: you cannot connect to or authenticate with the device through the primary channel at all. The exact thresholds and procedures are defined by you based on the asset, the mission, and your operational policies. For a hobby drone, the operator uses personal judgment. For a high-value military UAV, you would have a formal multi-person approval workflow with a full audit trail.
The process requires deliberate action. The operator must send a specific coded message through a specific channel. This is not something that happens by accident. For high-consequence environments, multi-person authorization adds another safeguard.
Random signals or garbled messages cannot trigger the override because the auxiliary controller only responds to the exact predetermined authentication code. Everything else is silently ignored. For environments where the stakes are high, you can layer on additional protections: require a second authorized person to confirm before the activation message goes out, or require the device to send a challenge back that the operator must answer before execution proceeds. You can also design the initial override action to be conservative and recoverable. For example, the first activation might just isolate the compromised communication path, not cut all power. The operator can then assess the situation and decide whether to escalate.
The process is designed so that false activation is a temporary, recoverable interruption, not a catastrophe. In relay-based implementations, the operator can send another coded message through the alternate channel to release the relay and restore the primary connection. The device resumes normal operation.
For power-cutoff implementations, the device enters its own built-in failsafe mode, like controlled descent for a drone or safe shutdown for industrial equipment. Compare that to the alternative. If the device is genuinely hijacked and you have no override capability, the device may be permanently lost. Multi-person authentication also helps reduce the chance of premature or accidental triggering in high-consequence environments.
The core patented pattern is operator-invoked override through a coded alternate path. Clients can add automation around it, but the process exists precisely because there are situations where the human operator sees what the system does not.
If you could reliably automate the detection of every possible compromise, you would not need this process. The value is in having a human-initiated recovery path for the cases where automated detection fails. That said, nothing stops you from adding monitoring tools that alert the operator when conditions look suspicious, or pre-staging the activation sequence so the operator only needs to confirm. The activation itself remains deliberate and authenticated. Automated detection handles known threat signatures. Manual override handles the gap. They are complementary layers, like automated fire detection and manual fire alarm pull stations.
Drones are one of the most natural use cases for this process. The implementation can be simple and low-cost, and the risk of losing a drone to RF hijacking is real.
Most commercial drones use RF as their primary control link. An attacker with a stronger signal on those frequencies can overpower your control link, and the drone may accept the hostile commands as legitimate. Its own failsafe logic never triggers because, from the drone’s perspective, nothing is wrong. An implementation can be as simple as a small circuit with a cellular module, microcontroller, relay, and small battery that listens on the cellular network. When you send an authenticated SMS with the correct code, the relay cuts the antenna connection or power to the primary receiver. The hijacker is locked out. The drone’s own return-to-home logic takes over from there.
It is strongest wherever remote command continuity matters and loss of control creates serious operational risk. Military UAVs, unmanned ground systems, remote support equipment, and fixed infrastructure with remote control functions are all direct use cases.
In contested environments, adversaries actively try to jam, spoof, or overpower RF control links. A military UAV operating beyond line of sight in a contested RF environment cannot rely solely on its own onboard logic to recognize a sophisticated takeover. If the attacker overpowers the control link with a stronger signal, the UAV may accept hostile commands as legitimate. Our process gives the authorized operator an independent path, using a different communication mode like satellite or an alternate military frequency, to cut off the compromised link and trigger recovery.
Connected vehicles depend on cellular and V2X links for telemetry, remote commands, and increasingly for autonomous driving functions. If that link is compromised, the operator needs a separate path to intervene.
The process provides an emergency alternate communication path between the vehicle side and the back-office operations center when the normal telematics channel is compromised. For autonomous ride-sharing fleets, that might mean the ability to stop a compromised vehicle. For connected commercial trucks, it could mean preventing hijacking of high-value cargo. The auxiliary controller can cut the ignition relay, disable the compromised telematics module, or report the vehicle’s GPS location through the alternate channel.
The third patent in our portfolio (US 12,037,132) addresses control systems where the primary means of communication has been lost, hijacked, or otherwise compromised. The process applies to environments where operators need a separate emergency path to isolate compromised communications and restore trusted control.
Think about a typical SCADA environment. Your primary control runs over Ethernet, industrial networks, or Internet connections. If an attacker gains access through that network, whether through ransomware, remote compromise, or insider threat, every control action you take flows through infrastructure the attacker may already own. Our process gives you an out-of-band path, using cellular or satellite, that is independent of the compromised plant network. The auxiliary controller can trigger relay contacts on critical valve actuators, circuit breakers, or other control points to isolate the compromised segment.
Energy infrastructure is a target for cyber attacks, and the consequences of uncontrolled systems in this sector can be severe.
For oil and gas pipelines, the process enables emergency valve closure at remote stations when the SCADA network has been compromised. For power grid substations, it can isolate compromised segments without relying on the compromised network to carry the isolation command. The auxiliary controller sits between the control network and the physical actuators, connected through relay contacts. When the operator sends an authenticated message via satellite or cellular, relays close critical valves or open circuit breakers, isolating the system from hostile control, independent of the IT/OT network.
Yes. The portfolio is not limited to vehicles and drones. Patent 2 (US 11,679,894) extends the process to facilities, and Patent 3 (US 12,037,132) extends it to control systems, including industrial control systems.
For a building or facility, think of it this way. Your access control, HVAC, fire suppression, and security systems are managed through a network. If that network is compromised, every command you send to those systems flows through infrastructure the attacker may control. Our process gives you an independent path to reach critical control points, like door locks, ventilation dampers, or power distribution panels, through a separate communication channel. The auxiliary controller can trip relay contacts to isolate specific zones, lock down access points, or shut off compromised subsystems, all without touching the compromised network.
It depends entirely on what you are protecting and how much protection you need. For a commercial drone, it can be a small, simple circuit. For a military platform or industrial facility, it is an engineering integration project.
The core mechanism is simple: receive an authenticated message on an alternate channel, validate it, and trigger a relay. That fundamental operation does not change regardless of the platform. What changes is how much security, redundancy, and sophistication you layer on top. For a mid-range drone, you are looking at a small microcontroller, a cellular module, a SIM card, a small battery, and a couple of relays, with simple code that listens for a specific coded SMS and toggles the relays. For a commercial vehicle fleet, you add 4G LTE, encrypted communications, GPS tracking, tamper detection, and a ruggedized enclosure. For critical infrastructure, you add satellite communication, hardware security modules, multi-factor authentication, and integration with your existing SCADA architecture. Each step up adds complexity, but none of it is exotic technology. These are well-understood components and protocols.
The process can be implemented with hardware, software, or a combination. The auxiliary controller can be a separate physical module or integrated into existing electronics. It depends on the system and the level of protection you need.
For the strongest physical isolation, separate hardware is ideal. A dedicated auxiliary controller with its own communication module, its own power supply, and its own relay connections cannot be reached or disabled through software attacks on the primary system. That is the whole point of independence. For systems where adding separate hardware is impractical, a software-based implementation using existing secondary communication hardware on the device is an option, though it provides less isolation. No firmware changes to the primary controller are required for the simplest relay-based implementation.
Both. The auxiliary controller can be added to existing systems or designed into new platforms from the start. Retrofit is practical and often the fastest path to deployment.
The relay-based approach is inherently retrofit-friendly. You are adding a small self-contained controller that connects to the existing system through relay contacts on antenna lines, power lines, or control signal lines. You do not need to modify the primary controller’s firmware. You do not need to redesign the communications architecture. The best candidates for retrofit are systems that have modular controllers and accessible interfaces, which includes many drones, vehicles with accessible wiring, and industrial control systems where you can access the wiring between controllers and actuators. For new designs, integration can be tighter and cleaner, with the auxiliary controller built into the device architecture from the start.
It can and should start narrow. Pick one high-value asset with clear risk and a defined recovery action. Prove it works. Then expand.
Start with a single asset or a small group of assets where the risk of losing control is real and the consequences are significant. Define a simple, conservative override action for the first implementation. Run a proof of concept that demonstrates normal operation, simulates a compromise scenario, sends the coded activation over the alternate channel, and shows successful disconnection and recovery. Refine the trigger criteria, the operator workflow, and the authentication procedures. Then expand to more assets, more complex recovery actions, and more sophisticated implementations.
We are open to virtually any deal structure: outright sale, exclusive license, non-exclusive license, limited rights, full rights with resale, geographic rights, field-of-use, revenue share, or hybrid arrangements. We would rather find the right fit than hold out for one specific structure.
Every conversation starts with understanding what you need.
Yes, consultation is available. We help clients map the patented process into their own architecture and operating needs. The license gives you the right to implement. The consultation helps you implement well. You retain full control over all implementation choices.
We have spent years developing this process and analyzing how it applies across drones, vehicles, industrial control systems, facilities, and connected infrastructure. We can help you identify the best insertion points for your specific systems, select appropriate communication channels for your operating environment, design authentication and activation workflows that match your security requirements, plan retrofit versus new-design integration, define trigger criteria and operator procedures, and structure your proof of concept.
A fit assessment around one asset class. We help you identify systems with meaningful remote-control risk, determine where a secondary path could exist, define the override action, and assess whether the process fits your architecture and governance model.
It is a focused conversation. You tell us what you are protecting, how it is controlled, and what your primary communication path looks like. We walk through where the auxiliary controller would sit, what alternate channel makes sense for your environment, what the override would do, and how activation authority would work in your organization. By the end of that conversation, you will know whether this is a strong fit and what a proof of concept would look like.
Reach out through our contact page or email info@stormfire.com. Whether you are evaluating this for a single product line or an enterprise-wide program, we are happy to start with a conversation.
There is no commitment required to have an initial discussion. We will walk through your use case, answer your questions, and help you determine whether this is a strong fit for your systems and your threat model. If it is, we will discuss licensing options and next steps.
